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Abstract
We propose a new simple trace logic that can be used to specify local security properties, i.e. security
properties that refer to a single participant of the protocol speciﬁcation. Our technique allows a
protocol designer to provide a formal speciﬁcation of the desired security properties, and integrate
it naturally into the design process of cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, the logic can be used
for formal veriﬁcation. We illustrate the utility of our technique by exposing new attacks on the
well studied TMN protocol.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are typically designed to meet security goals such
as authentication and conﬁdential key exchange. These goals, usually called
security properties, can be correctly accomplished if some of the values ex-
changed during the protocol run satisfy, for instance, classical properties like
authenticity, conﬁdentiality, or freshness.
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Often, the speciﬁcation of security properties is carried out by writing of
“global” security properties. These security speciﬁcations do not depend from
any principal’s point of view. Thus, to refer to a speciﬁc principal, global
security properties are usually deﬁned using extra protocol events [8,11].
In this paper, on the other hand, we propose a logic that can be used to
express local security properties, i.e. properties that refer to the speciﬁcation
of one agent, namely the agent which they belong to. As we show in the
following sections, local security properties are expressive enough to assert
the properties that are commonly desired for cryptographic protocols (e.g.,
freshness of a nonce.)
The advantage of local properties is that they allow a designer to specify
the security properties that should hold, according to each participant, at each
protocol execution point. For instance, a property like freshness of a nonce
can be speciﬁed as a formula that is connected directly to the corresponding
participant who receives that nonce. Furthermore, since these formulae cor-
respond to each principal, they depend only on information of that principal,
as opposed to a global formula that can depend on the whole network state.
Thus, a local formula can be bound to each principal and then be “plugged
in” into any other network speciﬁcation. This enables potential composability
of the speciﬁcations.
Consequently, using local properties, it is possible to integrate the speciﬁ-
cation of the (logical) security properties that a protocol has to meet within
the (algorithmic) speciﬁcation of the protocol itself. This yields an integrated
technique for protocol engineering that combines tightly the design and the
analysis phase, resulting in a shorter design-veriﬁcation feedback loop.
We illustrate our approach by studying the TMN protocol [10] for which
we have found two new attacks.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2, we describe our security protocol model.
Then, in Section 3 we introduce our trace logic language. In Section 4, the
TMN protocol is studied and some novel attacks upon it are presented. In
Section 5 elaborates the related work and ﬁnally conclusions and future work
are discussed in Section 6.
2 Protocol Model
A protocol step is usually speciﬁed using the standard notation A → B : M .
Here, M is a message built from:
• atomic terms, that is constants (written in lowercase) and variables (which
are capitalized). Constants may be nonces (e.g. na) or agent identities (e.g.
a). A special constant ε denotes the intruder.
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• constructed terms, that is a ﬁnite application of operators encryption MK ,
pairing M1,M2, hashing h(M) and ﬁnally public key pk(M) over atomic
terms.
However, the A → B : M notation is unsuitable for formal veriﬁcation. In
fact, in a protocol step, two diﬀerent events take place: A sends message M ,
and B receives message M ′. In presence of an intruder, M might not be equal
to M ′. Moreover, not even the identities of the correspondent communication
parties may be the same (i.e., A sends to B ′ and B receives from A′.) It
is therefore convenient to take an approach that considers separately each
agent’s point of view; this is the idea of protocol roles.
Definition 2.1 A protocol role is a pair 〈A, [M1  B1, ...,Mn  Bn]〉, where
A,B1, ..., Bn are variables,  ∈ {, } and M1, ...,Mn are messages. 
Given a protocol role 〈A, [M1 B1, ...,Mn Bn]〉, A is called the identity of
the role, while elements Mi Bi, i = 1..n are the actions of the role: M B is
a send action, while M  B is a receive action.
Protocol roles in a security protocol often receive (self explanatory) names
such as initiator, responder and server. For example,
responder(A,B,Na) = 〈B, [pk(Na)  A]〉 (1)
deﬁnes a responder role in which there is only one action, the receipt of Na
from A.
Notice that in (1), the variables A,B,Na are still uninstantiated (we bor-
row this concept from logic programming: as long as no value is assigned to
a variable, we call it uninstantiated, and instantiated otherwise.) In fact, a
protocol role is parametric, thus representing a template. By appropriately
(partially) instantiating a ﬁnite number of protocol roles, a system scenario
can be obtained:
Definition 2.2 A system scenario is a multiset of (partially) intantiated pro-
tocol roles.
Typically, a system scenario determines how many sessions are present and
which agents play which roles. For instance, the system scenario
{responder(A,b,Na), responder(C,d,Nc)}
(where responder is the role deﬁned above) deﬁnes a system scenario with
two responders (notice that there are no corresponding initiators), one played
by b and the other by d. Uninstantiated variables represent unknown values:
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for example, variable A in the ﬁrst responder role represents the (unknown)
communicating party of b.
2.1 Trace Semantics
Executions of system scenarios are described using traces, which are in turn
composed of events, i.e. single actions performed by an agent.
Definition 2.3 An event is a pair 〈A : M B〉 where A,B are agent’s names,
 ∈ {, } and M is a message. 
The event 〈A : M  B〉 should be read as “agent A sends message M with
intended destination B”. On the other hand, 〈B : M  A〉 stands for “agent
B receives message M apparently from A”.
To analyze the protocol, we combine the system scenario with the usual
Dolev-Yao intruder [5], who can perform the usual actions: intercept and learn
any sent message, store the information contained in intercepted messages for
later use, and introduce into the system new messages forged using information
the intruder knows. The information obtained by the intruder is stored in a
set of terms K called the intruder’s knowledge 4
Now we are ready to describe the execution of a system scenario, repre-
sented by the notion of a run.
Definition 2.4 Let S be a system scenario, and K be the intruder’s initial
knowledge, consisting of constants representing agents identities and their
public keys. Let tr be an initial empty trace. A run of S is a trace obtained
by a reiterated sequence of the following steps:
(i) a non-empty role in S is chosen nondeterministically, and its ﬁrst action
p is removed from it. Let a be the identity of the chosen role.
(ii) if p = t  y, then:
(a) t is added to the knowledge of the intruder, K := K ∪ {t}
(b) event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to tr, tr := tr · e
(iii) if p = t  y, then:
(a) it is checked if the intruder ε can generate t using the knowledge K 5 ,
if so, then event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to the trace: tr := tr · e.
(b) If ε cannot generate such a message, then the run stops.
4 Because of the symbolic nature of the analyzer, in practice an event can contain variables,
which stand for something the intruder can generate (see [3] for details.)
5 We adopt Millen and Shmatikov’s constraint solving procedure [13] for checking if the
intruder can generate a term t using knowledgeK. This procedure may involve instantiation
of variables in t or K; for example, t may unify with a term in K, representing that t is
already in K, i.e., is already known by the intruder (see [13] for details.)
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3 A Trace Logic
In this section we introduce a trace logic language for deﬁning local security
properties.
Definition 3.1 A trace logic formula is generated according to the following
grammar:
F ::= true | false | F1 ∧ F2 | F1 ∨ F2 | F1 → F2 | ∀e ∈ tr : F
| ∃e ∈ tr : F |∃t : F |¬F |e1 = e2 | e1  e2
where e, e1 and e2 are events. 
The conjunction of two formulae has the usual signiﬁcance: F1∧F2 is true
if both F1 and F2 are true; the disjunction operator ∨ and implication → are
analogous. On the other hand, the meaning of constructors ∀e ∈ tr : F and
∃e ∈ tr : F is non-standard. Since a trace formula is going to be evaluated
on a certain input trace, constructors ∀ and ∃ allow us to reason about the
events in the input trace: ∀e ∈ tr : F asserts that every event e in the input
trace satisﬁes formula F , while ∃e ∈ tr : F express that some event in the
input trace satisﬁes formula F . Notice that tr is not a variable, it is just
part of the operators name to emphasize that e ranges over the system trace.
Even though this gives a “temporal” ﬂavor to our logic, we anticipate that
these constructors only operate on past events, recorded in the input trace
(see later). Formula ¬F has the usual meaning of negation. Diﬀerently from
the above operators, ∃t : F quantiﬁes t over all messages and agents space.
Finally, predicates e1 = e2 and e1  e2 allow us to compare events: the former
asserts equality, and the latter subterm inclusion.
While the choice of these constructors may seem rather ad hoc for our
purposes, we believe this logic can in fact be quite expressive, and allow us
to assert a fairly large set of interesting security properties, as will be shown
later.
Next, we deﬁne the precise meaning of a trace logic formula.
Definition 3.2 Let F be the set of well-formed trace logic formulae, and TR
be the set of traces, then the semantic function [[·]]· : F ×TR → {true, false}
is deﬁned as follows:
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[[true]] tr = true
[[false]] tr = false
[[F1 ∧ F2]] tr = true iﬀ [[F1]] tr = [[F2]] tr = true
[[F1 ∨ F2]] tr = true iﬀ [[F1]] tr = true or [[F2]] tr = true
[[F1 → F2]] tr = true iﬀ [[F1]] tr implies [[F2]] tr
[[∀e ∈ tr : F ]] tr =true iﬀ, for each event x of tr, [[F [x/e]]] tr = true
[[∃e ∈ tr : F ]] tr =true iﬀ, for some event x of tr, [[F [x/e]]] tr = true
[[∃t : F ]] tr =true iﬀ, for some message or agent x, [[F [x/t]]] tr = true
[[¬F ]] tr = true iﬀ [[F ]] tr = false
[[e1 = e2]] tr = true iﬀ event e1 is equal to event e2
[[t1  t2]] tr = true iﬀ, if t1 is a subterm of t2

Here, F [x/y] is the result of substituting each occurrence of y with x in F .
For the sake of notation’s simplicity, we assume that all variables that are
not explicitly quantiﬁed are existentially quantiﬁed (over the set of messages
and agents). This simpliﬁes the notation considerably.
In the future, we plan to endow our logic with a proof system that allow
us to relate proofs of formulae with the intended meaning given by [[·]]·. In
the present work, we are more interested in exploring the expressive power of
security speciﬁcations; We plan to continue this work by addressing the issue
of using our logic for automatic formal veriﬁcation.
3.1 Appending local security properties to protocol roles
Now, we are ready to combine the deﬁnition of protocol roles and local security
properties to obtain extended protocol roles and extended system scenarios.
Intuitively, the idea is to embed the logical security properties within the
protocol speciﬁcation.
Definition 3.3 An extended protocol role is a triple 〈A, [M1B1 : F1, ...,Mn
Bn : Fn]〉, where {A,B1, ..., Bn} ⊂ V ar, M1, ...,Mn are messages,  ∈ {, }
and F1, ..., Fn are trace logic formulae. 
Intuitively, adding a formula Fi after a protocol role action means that Fi
must hold after the execution of the action. Notice that instantiation of an
extended protocol role also aﬀects the variables of an attached local security
property. This formalizes the notion of a security property being ‘local’, that
is a security speciﬁcation that takes into account the principal’s point of view.
Also, Fi is going to be evaluated w.r.t. the system trace, which contains the
events up to at that precise execution time. This, as we already mentioned,
illustrates the “past ﬂavour” nature of our formulae.
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Similarly, we can deﬁne an extended system scenario as a multiset of (par-
tially instantiated) extended protocol roles.
3.2 Verifying the local security properties
To evaluate the local security properties, we extend the Deﬁnition 3.4 to the
extended system scenarios introduced in last section:
Definition 3.4 Let S be an extended system scenario, and K be the in-
truder’s initial knowledge, consisting of constants representing agents identi-
ties and their public keys. Let tr be an initial empty trace. A run of S is a
trace obtained by a reiterated sequence of the following steps:
(i) a non-empty role in S is chosen nondeterministically, and its ﬁrst action
p is removed from it. Let a be the identity of the chosen role.
(ii) if p = t  y : F , then:
(a) if [[F ]]tr holds, then continue. Otherwise, the run stops.
(b) t is added to the knowledge of the intruder ε, K := K ∪ {t}
(c) event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to tr, tr := tr · e
(iii) if p = t  y : F , then:
(a) it is checked if the intruder ε can generate t using the knowledge
K (see below), if so, then event e = 〈a : p〉 is added to the trace:
tr := tr · e.
(b) if [[F ]]tr holds, then continue. Otherwise, the run stops.
(c) If ε cannot generate such a message, then the run stops.

For example, consider the role:
responder(B, A, Na) = 〈B, [Na  A : F ]〉
where F = ∃e : e = 〈A : Na  B〉.
After the responder B receives the nonce Na, F checks that A had sent
Na to B before. Now, consider the singleton scenario {responder(b,A,Na)}.
In this scenario, there is only one honest responder role, played by b. Now,
suppose this responder role receives, from the intruder ε, a nonce ni as Na.
Therefore, according to Deﬁnition 3.4, we have trace tr = 〈ε : ni  b〉. The
next step involves evaluation of [[F ]]tr to see if the local security property F
holds: clearly, we can see that [[∃e : e = 〈A : Na  b〉]]〈ε : ni  b〉 evaluates to
true, unifying A with ε and Na with ni.
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3.2.1 Implementation.
We have a (beta version) implementation of [[·]]·, encoded into our veriﬁer of
[3]. Using it, we were able to perform the veriﬁcation of the TMN protocol,
illustrated in the following section.
4 A Case Study: the TMN protocol
We apply our technique to a well known case study, the TMN protocol [10].
This protocol has been thoroughly studied, see for example [16,14,9]. However,
in this section we present some vulnerabilities that we believe no one has
noticed before.
4.1 Original Version
The original version of TMN was proposed for achieving key distribution be-
tween two users:
Message 1. A → S : A, S,B, {R1}pk(S)
Message 2. S → B : S,B,A
Message 3. B → S : B, S,A, {R2}pk(S)
Message 4. S → A : S,A,B, v(R1,R2)
We denote Vernam encryption by v(t1, t2)
6 . Here, keys R1 and R2 are sent
from A and B to S, respectively. After Message 4 is received, A can obtain
R2, thus making R2 the shared key between A and B.
4.1.1 TMN protocol roles.
The ﬁrst step in our design and veriﬁcation technique is to obtain the protocol
roles from the standard notation:
• Initiator: 〈A, [A, S,B, {R1}pk(S)  S : F1, S, A,B, v(R1,R2)  S : F2]〉
• Responder: 〈B, [S,B,A  S : F3, B, S, A, {R2}pk(S)  S : F4]〉
• Server: 〈S, [A, S,B, {R1}pk(S) A : F5, S, B,AB : F6, B, S, A, {R2}pk(S)
B : F7, S, A,B, v(R1,R2)  A : F8]〉
This translation can be tedious and error-prone when protocols get large;
however, we believe this step can be mostly automated (eg. by a tool assisting
the user.)
6 We currently model Vernam encryption as normal symmetric encryption, and not as full
exclusive xor.
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The original version of TMN suﬀers from several secrecy attacks over R2
above, as exposed for instance in [9]. Thus, we will concentrate on two modi-
ﬁed versions of the protocol.
4.2 First modification
A replay attack against TMN was exposed by Simmons [18]. The attack ex-
ploits the fact that the messages to the server from A and B (Message 1 and
Message 3) can be replayed. To solve this deﬃciency, Tatebayashi and Mat-
suzaki introduce timestamps in messages 1 and 3 [10]:
Message 1. A → S : A, S,B, {TA,R1}pk(S)
Message 2. S → B : S,B,A
Message 3. B → S : B, S,A, {TB,R2}pk(S)
Message 4. S → A : S,A,B, v(R1,R2)
In this new protocol, after receiving TA and TB, the server can check for
the timeliness of these timestamps. According to Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki,
this new protocol version guarantess the freshness of R1 and R2. To check if
this is true, we can specify the freshness requirements of R1 and R2 as a local
security properties of server S:
FreshRi = ∀e ∈ tr : last event(e) ∨ ¬(Ri  msg(e)) (for i = 1, 2)
Where primitive msg(·) projects the message of an event, deﬁned as msg(〈x :
m  y〉) = m and predicate last event(e) is a primitive that is true iﬀ e is
the last event of trace tr. The deﬁnition of this primitive is straightforward:
[[last event(e)]] tr = true iﬀ tr = tr′ · e. FreshR1 and FreshR2 are expressing
that R1 and R2, respectively, are fresh.
The last step involves deciding where to put FreshR1 and FreshR2 in the
server role. This is easy: we make the decision that the formulae for checking
the freshness of the received values should be placed as soon as the values
are received. Thus, FreshR1 can be put as F5, that is, after R1 is received.
Similarly, we set FreshR2 as F7.
4.3 First novel attack
After veriﬁcation, we found a violation of formula F5 (that is, freshness of R1).
The attack is reported in Table 1.
In this attack, the intruder starts replacing messages α.1 with α.1′ and α.3
with α.3′, and ﬁnally obtains r1 from message α.4. But, when it wants to use
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Table 1
R1 freshness attack. ε(s) is ε masquerading as s. α and β denote two diﬀerent runs.
Message α.1. a → ε(s) : a, s, b, {ta, r1}pk(s)
Message α.1′. ε(a) → s : a, s, b, {te1, re}pk(s)
Message α.2. s → b : s, b, a
Message α.3. b → ε(s) : b, s, a, {tb, r2}pk(s)
Message α.3′. ε(b) → s : b, s, a, {ta, r1}pk(s)
Message α.4. s → ε(a) : s, a, b, v(re, r1)
Message β.1. ε(a) → s : a, s, b, {te2, r1}pk(s)
it in a new run β, even if the intruder uses a new (not expired) timestamp
te2, the formula F5 does not hold since r1 is not fresh (note that s is the same
server, involved in both runs α and β). It is important to notice why this
attack represents a vulnerability of the protocol. According to Tatebayashi
and Matsuzaki, the server has to check for the validity of the timestamps in
order to guarantee the freshness of R1 and R2; as we can see in this attack,
this is not suﬃcient. To the best of our knowledge, this vulnerability was
never exposed before.
4.4 Second modification
A modiﬁcation to assure authentication of the initiator and responder to the
server consists in using SA and SB, shared secrets between S and A and B
respectively, in the following manner:
Message 1. A → S : A, S,B, {TA, SA,R1}pk(S)
Message 2. S → B : S,B,A
Message 3. B → S : B, S,A, {TB, SB,R2}pk(S)
Message 4. S → A : S,A,B, v(R1,R2)
After receiving messages 1 and 3, the server can authenticate A and B,
respectively, since (by assumption) secrets SA and SB are shared only between
the server and the respective agents. To check if the protocol accomplishes
the authentication goal of A and B to S, we translate this in a formula that
states that if S received a message M apparently from A (resp. B), then
it was really sent by A (B). Server S authenticates A after receiving the
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ﬁrst message, so at that point we set our formula: F5 = ∃e : e = 〈A :
A, S,B, {TA, SA,R1}pk(S)  S〉. Similarly, S authenticates B after the third
message: F7 = ∃e : e = 〈B : B, S,A, {TB, SB,R2}pk(S)  S〉.
We performed veriﬁcation with some test scenarios and did not ﬁnd any
trace that violates the above security requirements. Thus, we can regard the
protocol to be secure for the system scenarios we tested; of course, bigger
scenarios can be tested to increase conﬁdence about the protocol security.
4.5 Mutual authentication
Even though Tatebayashi and Matsuzaki do not state the mutual authentica-
tion of A and B, it is interesting to consider this case (Lowe and Roscoe [9]
also discuss this.) We can translate this requirement by redeﬁning two formu-
lae, namely F3 and F2. We deﬁne F3 to express the local security property of
A to B and F2 expressing the authentication of B to A:
• M authenticity of A to B: F3 = ∃e : e = 〈A : A, S,B, {TA, SA, R1}pk(S) S〉;
• M authenticity of B to A: F2 = ∃e : e = 〈B : B, S,A, {TB, SB, R2}pk(S)S〉.
Proceeding with veriﬁcation, we found traces that violate F2 and F3. The
attack trace for F3 is straightforward, consisting in only one message, sent
from ε(s) to b: s, b, a. But this is suﬃcient to violate formula F3, since when
b receives s, b, a she wants to check if a sent a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s), which she
did not (this attack is similar to attack 7.1 in [9].)
4.6 Novel authentication attacks
In Table 2 we report two attacks that violate F2.
Table 2
B to A authentication attacks
α.1. a → ε(s) : a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s) α.1.a → ε(s) : a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s)
α.2. ε(s) → b : s, b, ε β.1.ε → s : ε, s, a, {te, se, re1}pk(s)
α.3. b → ε(s) : b, s, ε, {tb, sb, r2}pk(s) β.2.s → ε(a) : s, a, ε
β.1. ε(a) → s : a, s, b, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s) β.3.ε(a) → s : a, s, ε, {ta, sa, r1}pk(s)
β.2. s → ε(b) : s, b, a β.4.s → ε : s, ε, a, v(re1, r1)
β.3. ε(b) → s : b, s, a, {tb, sb, r2}pk(s) α.4.ε(s) → a : s, a, b, v(r1, re1)
β.4. s → ε(a) : s, a, b, v(r1, r2)
α.4. ε(s) → a : s, a, b, v(r1, r2)
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The attack of Table 2 (left side) is successful since the intruder can ma-
nipulate the ﬁrst three non-encrypted ﬁelds. Notice how F2 is violated: when
a receives message α.4, b never sent message b, s, a, {tb, sb, r2}pk(b). The attack
reported in Table 2 (right side) is stronger, since the principal b is not alive
in the run of a.
We believe these attacks over this modiﬁed version of the TMN protocol
have never been reported before in the literature.
5 Related Work
In this section we discuss some related work. In [16], Roscoe identiﬁes two
ways of specifying protocol security goals: ﬁrstly, using extensional speciﬁ-
cations, and secondly using intensional speciﬁcations. An extensional spec-
iﬁcation describes the intended service provided by the protocol in terms of
behavioural equivalence [6,1,17]. On the other hand, an intensional speciﬁca-
tion describes the underlying mechanism of a procotol, in terms of states or
events [2,21,16,19,15,7].
The approach presented in this paper belongs to the spectrum of inten-
sional speciﬁcations, and is related to [16,19]. In [19], a requirement speci-
ﬁcation language is proposed. This language is useful for specifying sets of
requirements for classes of protocol; the requirements can be mapped onto a
particular protocol instance, which can be later veriﬁed using their tool, called
NRL Protocol Analyzer. This approach has been subsequently used to specify
the GDOI secure multicast protocol [12].
In [16], Roscoe presents a method for describing the underlying mechanism
of a protocol, using a CSP speciﬁcation. The method consists of four steps:
Firstly, one identiﬁes an execution point of the protocol that should not be
reached without a corresponding legitimate run having occurred. Secondly,
one describes the possible sequences of messages that should have occurred
before this execution point; thirdly, one creates a speciﬁcation which groups
all the CSP processes modelling the protocol participants (this step is similar
to our scenario setting). Finally, one veriﬁes the speciﬁcation using FDR. This
method has been also used by Lowe in [9].
The approaches just mentioned employ languages specifying security prop-
erties in a global fashion, as opposed to our technique which deals with local
security properties.
In [4], Cremers, Mauw and de Vink present another logic for specifying
local security properties. Similarly to us, in [4] the authors deﬁne the message
authenticity property by referring to the variables occurring in the protocol
role. In addition, in [4], it is deﬁned a new kind of authentication, called
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synchonization, which is then compared with the Lowe’s intensional speciﬁca-
tion. The logic presented in this paper cannot handle the speciﬁcation of the
synchronization authentication. In fact, we cannot handle the weaker notion
of injective authentication, since we cannot match corresponding events in a
trace. However, we believe we can extend our logic to support these prop-
erties. Brieﬂy, this could be achieved by decorating the diﬀerent runs with
label identiﬁers and adding a primitive to reason about events that happenned
before others in a trace.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have developed a trace logic for expressing local security properties. Using
this trace logic, the protocol designer can specify precisely the (local) security
properties a protocol should satisfy to accomplish the security goals for which
it has been designed.
The main diﬀerences between our approach and the ones mentioned in
Section 5 can be summarized as follows:
(i) Our trace logic formulae are local to the participants, in the sense that
are dependent to the principal’s point of view, instead of global to the
protocol speciﬁcation. This allow us to deﬁne properties more precisely,
in the sense of what should hold for each principal at each execution step.
Furthermore, our technique can be used to integrate the speciﬁcation
within the design of a cryptographic protocol. Methodologically, this
allows for the integration of the veriﬁcation phase within the design one,
speeding up the feedback from the veriﬁcation, and providing the basis
for an integrated environment for protocol engineering.
(ii) Without having to use temporal operators, the logic we presented can
express classical security properties including freshness and authenticity
of the exchanged values during a protocol run.
(iii) Our logic is applied directly to the protocol messages. This allow us to
reason about (local) security properties without having to use artiﬁcial
event messages.
As future work, we plan to apply the methodology to more complex case
studies, such as multicast protocols e.g. LKH group communications protocol
[20]. We also plan to study how to compose local security speciﬁcations: we
believe this is a very important advantage of our approach over the other
global ones.
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